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Abstract
This article reviews the main sources of data on the geographic composition of countries
external balance sheets, covering both international and country-specic sources. It examines
the determinants of bilateral nancial assets and liabilities and discusses how gravity models,
traditionally used in the trade literature, have been applied to explain bilateral nancial links.
A new dataset is used to derive some stylized facts on how bilateral nancial links look like, how
they have evolved over time and how they compare with trade links. The role that cross-border
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1 Introduction
The last two decades have witnessed a large increase in the size of countriesexternal balance sheets.
This nancial globalization phenomenon has been documented in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007),
who construct a comprehensive dataset with annual data on total external assets and liabilities for
178 economies in the period from 1970 to 2007.
This dataset can be used to construct a measure of nancial integration by computing the
ratio of the sum of total foreign assets and liabilities to GDP. Figure 1 reports the evolution of this
measure for a group of industrial countries and a group of emerging and developing economies. The
gure shows a marked increase in nancial integration, especially from the mid-1990s in industrial
countries.
The Lane and Milesi-Ferretti dataset lls an important gap by providing data on total external
assets and liabilities. However, very little is known about the geographic composition of countries
external balance sheets. A better understanding of this geographic composition would be extremely
valuable, especially for analysing how shocks are transmitted across borders.
The next section describes a number of international and country-specic data sources on bilat-
eral nancial assets and liabilities. Section 3 examines the determinants of those bilateral nancial
links and discusses how gravity models, traditionally used in the trade literature, have been in-
creasingly applied to explain cross-border nancial transactions and holdings. Section 4 uses a new
dataset of bilateral nancial links to derive some stylized facts on how those links look like, how
they have evolved over time and how they compare with trade links. Section 5 discusses the role of
bilateral nancial links in the international transmission of shocks, with reference to the 2007-2009
nancial crisis. Section 6 concludes.
2 Bilateral data on external assets and liabilities
Countriesexternal balance sheets contain the following main categories:
 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), which includes equity participations above 10%.
 Portfolio equity securities, which includes equity participations below 10%.
 Debt, which includes portfolio debt securities (such as bonds and money market instruments)
and other debt instruments (such as loans and deposits).
 Foreign exchange reserve assets
While no comprehensive dataset exists for bilateral external assets and liabilities covering a large
number of countries over a long period, some data do exist both from international and country-
specic sources covering some components of the external balance sheets for some countries.
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2.1 Main international data sources
 Foreign Direct Investment
Data on bilateral FDI assets and liabilities are available from two main sources. The OECD
International Direct Investment by Country dataset contains annual data on bilateral FDI ows
and stocks at book value for OECD countries starting in 1981. The United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Foreign Direct Investment dataset also contains annual data
on bilateral FDI ows and stocks. Coverage is broader than for the OECD dataset, including data
for 196 reporting countries. For many country pairs bilateral data do not start until the 1990s, but
for some pairs they are available from the 1970s.
 Portfolio equity and portfolio debt securities
The IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) contains information on bilateral
portfolio investment positions broken down by instrument (equity and debt). Debt instruments are
disaggregated into long-term and short-term debt, where short-term debt is dened as having a
maturity of up to one year. A pilot survey was conducted in 1997 with only 29 reporting countries.
The survey was reintroduced in 2001 and has been conducted on an annual basis in 75 reporting
countries.
 Banking assets and liabilities
The BIS collects two datasets on banking assets and liabilities: locational and consolidated
banking statistics.
Locational banking statistics contain quarterly data on cross-border assets and liabilities held
in all currencies by banks in 35 reporting countries vis-à-vis banks and non-banks located in other
countries. It also covers assets and liabilities vis-à-vis residents in foreign currency. The data are
disaggregated by instrument: loans and deposits, debt securities and other assets and liabilities (in-
cluding portfolio equity and direct investment assets). There is also a breakdown by major currency,
sector of the counterparty (banks and non-banks) and country of residence of the counterparty (in-
cluding about 200 counterparty countries). The earliest year for which data are available is 1977,
but some countries started reporting at a later date. Consolidated banking statistics are similar
but, instead of being broken down by country of residence of the counterparty, are broken down
by country of nationality of the reporting bank after netting out intra-group positions. In other
words, the consolidated statistics are based on the country where the reporting banks head o¢ ce is
located and look through inter-o¢ ce positions to capture exposures to una¢ liated counterparties.
For example, if a UK branch of Santander (a Spanish group) lends to UK households in British
pounds, locational data would not record this transaction as it would be considered domestic lend-
ing. Consolidated data, on the other hand, would register the transaction as an asset of Spain
in the UK. Similarly, if a UK branch of Santander lends to a Spanish household, the transaction
would be recorded as an asset of the UK in Spain in locational data, but would not be recorded
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in consolidated data. Only assets are reported in the consolidated statistics and no information on
liabilities is collected.
 Foreign Exchange Reserves
Foreign exchange reserves play an increasingly important role in linking emerging markets and
developed economies. Figure 2 shows the total value of foreign exchange reserves held by emerging
and developing economies. In the period from 1995 to 2009 foreign exchange reserves increased by
a factor of 11, from about half a trillion dollars in 1995 to over 5 trillion in 2009. Around 60% of the
total amount of reserves of these economies in 2009 is held in US dollars. Because some countries
outside the US issue assets denominated in US dollars, there is no exact correspondence between
the currency composition and the geographic composition of foreign exchange reserves. However,
it is safe to assume that most reserves held in US dollars are issued by the US.
The data in Figure 2 are obtained from the IMF Currency Composition of O¢ cial Foreign
Exchange Reserves (COFER) dataset, which contains the total amount of reserves held in ve major
currencies by a group of advanced economies and a group of emerging and developing economies.
For condentiality reasons, no information on the currency composition of reserves for individual
countries is released. The BIS Multilateral Surveillance Statistics contain data on the currency
composition of reserves for countries in the G10 since 1994. However, again due to condentiality,
these data are not publicly available.
2.2 Other data sources
 Euro Area accounts
The European Central Bank collects data on the international investment position of the Euro
Area. This dataset contains information on stocks of external assets and liabilities of the Euro
Area as a whole by asset class (FDI, portfolio debt, portfolio equity, nancial derivatives, and other
investment). The geographic breakdown is limited to a few countries outside the Euro Area (Brazil,
Canada, China, Denmark, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the
US). Information is disaggregated by asset class: direct investment, portfolio investment, nancial
derivatives, other investment, and reserve assets. Portfolio liabilities are the only category for which
no geographic breakdown is available.
 Individual country data sources
Some countries collect their own data on bilateral external assets and liabilities.
The US Treasury International Capital (TIC) reporting system collects a variety of data on
US cross-border securities. Data on ows (transactions) are monthly and cover only long-term
securities (i.e. securities with a maturity of more than one year). They are collected by country
and record purchases by foreigners from US residents and sales by foreigners to US residents of US
assets (equity, US Treasury debt, US government agency debt and US corporate bonds) and foreign
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assets (bonds and stocks). Data on stocks of both foreign holdings of US securities (US liabilities)
and US holdings of foreign securities (US assets) are collected in annual surveys and are broken
down by country and type of security: equity, long term debt and short term debt. Long term and
short term debt are disaggregated further into Treasury, agency and corporate debt. Information
goes back to 1974, but until 2001 only data on long term securities were collected.
The Bundesbank external stock statistics contain monthly data on the geographic composition
of short-term and long-term external assets and liabilities of banks in Germany going back to the
early 1980s. Similar data are collected for the external positions of enterprises in Germany.
2.3 Custodial centre bias
Data on external nancial assets and liabilities are normally constructed following the residence
principle. For example, if a German resident invests in a Chinese company and directs the invest-
ment via a nancial institution located in the UK, the transaction would be recorded as an asset
of Germany in the UK and an asset of the UK in China, even though the UK has only acted as an
intermediary. This practice tends to attribute excessively large holdings to countries that are major
custodial centres, such as the Cayman Islands, Luxembourg and Switzerland. This custodial bias
is present to di¤erent degrees in various sources of data on bilateral external positions.
For FDI, data on bilateral assets are collected following the residence principle and are therefore
subject to this bias. However, data on liabilities are collected following the ultimate beneciary
owner principle, according to which the source of inward FDI is allocated to the country of ultimate
ownership. As a result, data on FDI liabilities do not su¤er from a custodial bias.
For portfolio equity and debt, the annual surveys conducted in the US by the TIC reporting
system correct for this bias on the assets side. Because the surveys collect data at the level of
individual securities, they are able to identify precisely the country of residence of each security
issuer. However, the bias remains on the liabilities side, since the chains of intermediation through
nancial centres frequently make identication of the actual owners of US securities impossible.
For other countries that report to the IMF CPIS the problem is even more severe than for the
US because, unlike the US, many countries do not conduct comprehensive security-level surveys.
Hence, CPIS data reported by these countries will su¤er from the custodial centre biasnot only
on the liabilities side but also on the assets side.
The BIS locational data on banking assets are constructed following the residence principle
and therefore su¤er from the custodial centre bias. The consolidated data are less a¤ected by
this bias because they are based on the nationality of the reporting bank and net out intra-group
positions. To the extent that banks use as custodians other banks from the same group, the bias
would disappear once intra-group positions are netted out. Which type of data  locational or
consolidated is preferable depends on the question being addressed. Locational data provide an
idea of the broad trends in cross-border links. Consolidated data may be preferable for analysing
the transmission of shocks between banks, but this depends on whether foreign subsidiaries and
branches fund themselves locally or in their country of nationality. For example, suppose that UK
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branches of Santander borrow mostly from UK households and lend to China. Consolidated data
would treat this as an investment of Spain in China. This may be appropriate to study the e¤ect
of a shock in China on Santander as a group. However, it would not be appropriate to study the
e¤ect of a shock in the UK for cross-border capital ows. For this question, locational data would
be preferable. If the branches and subsidiaries of Santander fund themselves mostly in Spain, then
consolidated data would give a more accurate picture.
Ideally, data based both on the residence principle and on the country of ultimate ownership
should be available. By comparing the two, the role played by custodial centres in the international
nancial system could be properly understood.
3 What explains bilateral external nancial linkages?
3.1 Theoretical foundation for gravity models in goods trade
Gravity models have long been used to explain bilateral trade in goods. They explain trade ows
between countries i and j by their sizes (GDPs) and a variety of variables capturing the geographic
and historical proximity between the two counties (distance, common language, common border,
and other factors that a¤ect trade barriers).
The theoretical foundation for the use of gravity models in the trade literature is provided by
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), among others. Anderson and van Wincoop develop a model
with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences and goods that are di¤erentiated by
country of origin. Prices of the same goods di¤er across locations due to trade costs that are not
directly observable. These trade costs include not just transport costs but also information costs,
design costs and various legal and regulatory costs. The solution to the model yields a gravity
equation of the form:
Xij =
yiyj
yw
(
 ij
PiPj
)1  (1)
where  is the elasticity of substitution.
The gravity equation says that the ow of exports from country i to country j (Xij) depends on
GDP of the two counties relative to world GDP (yiyjyw ) and on the bilateral trade costs between them
( ij) relative to the product of their multilateral resistance variables (Pi and Pj). The multilateral
resistance variables are aggregate measures of each countrys trade costs relative to all its trading
partners. An increase in the multilateral resistance of the importer (Pj) raises its trade with the
exporter. For a given bilateral trade barrier between i and j, higher barriers between j and its
other trading partners will reduce the relative price of goods from i and raise imports from i. An
increase in multilateral resistance of the exporter (Pi) also raises its trade with j. Higher trade
barriers faced by an exporter lower the demand for its goods. For a given bilateral trade barrier
between i and j, this raises the level of trade between them.
When going from the gravity equation derived from the Anderson and van Wincoop model to
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the data, a key issue is how to measure the unobservable bilateral trade costs. This can be done
using a variety of observable variables that a¤ect trade barriers (for example, the distance between
the two countries, whether they share a common border or a common language). Therefore, the
empirical counterpart of equation (1) would take the following form:
ln(Xij) =  
MX
m=1
mZ
m
ij + i + j + "ij (2)
Unobservable bilateral trade costs are captured by a set ofM observable variables Zmij . Exporter
and importer xed e¤ects (i and j) capture the GDP of the two countries as well as their
multilateral resistance variables.
3.2 Theoretical foundation for gravity models in cross-border asset trade
Several recent papers have applied gravity models to explain bilateral nancial stocks and ows.
Given the increasing popularity of these models in nance, some recent work has been done to
develop the theoretical foundations for these models in explaining trade in assets, in a similar way
as Andersen and van Wincoop did for trade in goods.
Martin and Rey (2004) develop a general equilibrium model where assets are imperfect substi-
tutes because they hedge against di¤erent types of risks. Cross-border asset trade involves some
transaction and/or information costs and the supply of assets is endogenous. In their framework,
risk-averse agents undertake a number of projects which correspond to di¤erent assets and are
traded on stock markets. Higher aggregate demand from foreign investors raises the price of these
assets and encourages agents to undertake more projects and trade more assets. Therefore, market
capitalization is endogenous.
The model by Martin and Rey delivers an equation where transactions in equities from country
i to country j depend on the economic masses of the two countries (for example, equity market
capitalization) and trading costs between them. Because trading costs are not observable, they need
to be measured by a set of variables capturing the geographic, cultural and information proximity
between the two countries. Hence, their model delivers a gravity equation analogous to equation
(2) from the goods trade literature.
Okawa and van Wincoop (2010) follow a di¤erent approach and add information asymmetries
to a static portfolio choice model. Investors can hold claims on risky assets from a large number
of countries. Asset returns are a¤ected both by country-specic risk and by global risk. There is
one risky asset whose return is only related to global risk. In addition to these risky assets, there
is also a risk-free asset.
The bilateral information friction between source country j and destination country i is dened
as the conditional variance of country i specic risk from the perspective of country j investors
divided by the conditional variance of country i specic risk from the perspective of country i
investors. Hence, it measures the information disadvantage of foreign investors relative to local
investors.
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The Okawa and van Wincoop model yields the following gravity equation:
Xij =
SiEj
E
iPj
 ij
(3)
Bilateral asset holdings of country j in country i (Xij) are driven by two factors. The rst is
a size factor: the product of total equity holdings by country j (Ej) and the supply of equity by
country i (Si) divided by the world demand or supply (E). The second factor is a relative friction
(iPj ij ), where i and Pj are the multilateral resistance variables that measure the average nancial
frictions for country i as a destination country and country j as a source country.
The intuition for the presence of multilateral resistance variables is similar to the goods trade
model. Investors in country j allocate a larger part of their equity holdings to destination countries
for which the bilateral nancial friction ( ij) is low in comparison to the average nancial friction
that it faces relative to all destination countries (Pj). Also, an increase in multilateral resistance of
the destination country (i) implies that country i faces high nancial frictions with many source
countries and must pay a higher return to those countries in order to attract investment. For a
given bilateral nancial friction  ij , this means that country i will prefer to attract investment from
country j and Xij increases.
This equation is analogous to equation (1) from the Andersen and van Wincoop goods trade
model. Its empirical counterpart is equation (2), where Zmij is a set of variables capturing unob-
servable nancial frictions (for example, the log distance between i and j). This would be the
appropriate estimated equation with cross-sectional data. With panel data the size variables and
the multilateral resistance variables will have a time dimension as well. The estimated gravity
equation should then include separate destination and source country dummies for each period t:
ln(Xijt) =  
MX
m=1
mZ
m
ijt + it + jt + "ijt (4)
3.3 Information asymmetries, familiarity e¤ects and trust
Studies that apply gravity models to explain bilateral nancial stocks and ows have found that
these models perform quite well, typically explaining more than 70% of the variation in cross-border
ows and stocks of foreign assets.
For example, Portes and Rey (2005) use a gravity model to explain bilateral cross-border equity
ows between 14 economies in the period from 1980 to 1996. They nd that the model performs at
least as well as when applied to goods trade. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) use a gravity model
to explain stocks of bilateral portfolio equity in 2001 using data from the IMF CPIS. They nd
that bilateral equity holdings are strongly correlated with bilateral trade in goods and services and
are also positively associated with measures of proximity. Daude and Stein (2007) focus on the
determinants of FDI stocks in OECD countries in the late 1990s and nd that di¤erences in time
zones have a negative and signicant e¤ect in the location of FDI.
The nding that variables such as distance, di¤erences in time zones and cultural a¢ nities may
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explain a large proportion of cross-border asset ows and stocks may seem surprising. Unlike goods,
assets are not subject to transportation costs. The fact that gravity variables perform at least as
well in explaining nancial positions as in explaining trade suggests that nancial markets are not
frictionless, but are segmented by information asymmetries and familiarity e¤ects. Distance and
measures of cultural a¢ nities are proxies for those information asymmetries and familiarity e¤ects.
The information required to evaluate nancial assets such as corporate bonds and equities
is not straightforward. It includes information about the structure of asset markets and their
institutions, accounting practices, corporate culture and political events. There is some evidence
in the literature on the importance of information for nancial transactions. For example, Coval
and Moskowitz (2001) show that US mutual funds which invest primarily in companies whose
headquarters are located nearby earn substantial abnormal returns. Hau (2001) nds that foreign
traders make signicant less prot than German traders when they transact on the German stock
market. Information asymmetries are one of the explanations given in the nance literature for the
home bias puzzle, i.e., the fact that investors allocate a large proportion of their wealth to domestic
assets, in spite of the potential benets from diversifying into foreign assets.
The set of observable variables used in the literature to capture information asymmetries and
familiarity e¤ects is varied. Some commonly used variables are distance, indicators for common
border, common language and colonial links and the time di¤erence between the source and des-
tination countries. Portes and Rey also include the volume of telephone call tra¢ c between the
source and destination countries to measure the overall information ow between them and the
number of branches in the destination country of banks headquartered in the source country.
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009) made a creative addition to the list of variables normally
used in the gravity literature by including bilateral trust in gravity models for trade, portfolio
investment and FDI. The Eurobarometer surveys ask respondents in each European Union country
to report how much they trust the citizens of each of the other countries in the EU. Using this
measure of bilateral trust on gravity equations, the authors nd that a higher level of bilateral trust
can explain cross-country trade beyond what extended gravity models can account for. At sample
means, a one-standard-deviation increase in the importers trust toward the exporter raises exports
by 10%. They also nd that trust matters more for trade in goods that are di¤erentiated, which
can vary greatly in quality. One possible explanation for this nding is that trust helps overcome
information asymmetries and contract incompleteness problems, which are more severe for more
di¤erentiated goods.
In the gravity model for FDI, the authors use data on bilateral FDI stocks from the OECD and
look at the e¤ect of country is trust towards people of country j on the FDI of country i in country
j. They nd that the magnitude of the impact of trust on FDI is twice as large as the impact on
trade. This is not surprising because FDI are long-term investments and hence are more a¤ected
by information asymmetries and contract incompleteness than trade. For that reason, FDI should
be very trust intensive.
To look at the e¤ect of trust on portfolio investment, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales use data
8
on the geographic breakdown of equity investment of European mutual funds disaggregated by
country of origin. Because portfolio investment is mostly composed of traded securities that are
heavily monitored and regulated, information asymmetries and contract incompleteness problems
should be limited. Moreover, mutual funds are run by sophisticated managers who are likely to have
better information about the securities. Nevertheless, the authors nd a positive and statistically
signicant e¤ect of the degree of trust of country i towards country j on the percentage of equity
invested by country i in country j.
The gravity model used by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales is quite broad. It includes the appropri-
ate source countryyear and destination countryyear xed e¤ects, as suggested by Anderson and
van Wincoop and Okawa and van Wincoop. In addition, it includes the standard gravity variables
(log distance, common language, common border, common linguistic roots) as well as a measure
of transportation costs, an indicator for same legal origin and a measure of the extent of press
coverage of the source country in the destination country (the number of articles in the newspapers
of the destination country that mention the source country or its citizens in the headline).
One di¢ culty in interpreting the results of this study is the possibility of reverse causality:
although it is possible that trust promotes trade and investment, it is equally possible that trade and
investment lead to more trust. To address these concerns, the authors use instrumental variables
estimation. They instrument for trust using its cultural determinants: commonality of religion and
an indicator of the somatic distance between two countries, which is based on the frequency of
certain traits in the indigenous population (for example height or hair colour). Their IV estimates
for the e¤ect of trust are even larger, suggesting that culture is likely to a¤ect trade and investment
through other channels besides trust.
4 Stylized facts
4.1 Data
This section examines how bilateral nancial links have evolved over time and compares it with the
evolution of trade links. It uses a dataset constructed by Kubelec and Sá (2010), which contains data
on stocks of bilateral external assets and liabilities for a group of 18 countries, including developed
and emerging economies1. The dataset covers the period from 1980 to 2005 and distinguishes
between four asset classes: FDI, portfolio equity, debt, and foreign exchange reserves.
To construct this dataset, Kubelec and Sá use some of the data sources listed in section 2 and
ll in gaps in the data using gravity models of the type described in section 3. In this way they
obtain a comprehensive dataset with no missing data for the 18 countries in their sample.
1The countries in the sample are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong,
India, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, the UK and the US.
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4.2 Network of nancial linkages
The international nancial system can be seen as a network, where nodes represent countries and
links represent bilateral nancial assets. The Kubelec and Sá dataset provides information on the
links and can be used to analyse how the global nancial network has changed over time. This
section uses network methods to show the key stylized facts that emerge from the data.
4.2.1 Undirected network
Figure 3 looks at the evolution of the global nancial network Links are given by the sum of bilateral
assets and liabilities divided by the sum of the GDP of the source and host countries:
linkijt =
Assetsijt + Liabilitiesijt
GDPit +GDPjt
(5)
Since assets and liabilities are symmetrical, the network is undirected, i.e., the link from i to j
is the same as the link from j to i. To simplify the diagrams, the smallest links (where the ratio
dened above is lower than 0:3%) are not represented. The thickness of the lines indicates the size
of the links and the size of the nodes is proportional to the countrys nancial openness, measured
by the sum of its total external assets and liabilities divided by GDP. More interconnected countries
are placed more centrally in the network and pairs of countries with stronger links are placed closer
to each other.
Table 1 provides some summary statistics about the network: skewness of the distribution of
links, average path length and clustering. Skewness is a measure of the asymmetry of a distribution.
A positive value indicates that the distribution has a long tail on the right, i.e., there are many
observations with small links and few observations with large links. Average path length is the
average of the shortest paths between all pairs of nodes in the network. Clustering measures the
probability that, given than node i is directly linked to nodes j and k, node j is also directly linked
to k.
A few ndings emerge:
 The interconnectivity of the global nancial network has increased signicantly over the past
two decades. This can be seen from the increase in the size of the nodes and the increase in
number and size of the links.
 The distribution of nancial links exhibits a long-tail. High values of skewness indicate that
the global nancial network is characterized by a large number of small links and a small
number of large links.
 The average path length of the global nancial network has decreased over time. In 2005
there are less than 1:4 degrees of separation on average between any two nodes.
 The network has become more clustered over time. This is another symptom of the increase
in interconnectivity.
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4.2.2 Directed network
Figure 4 looks at the evolution of the global nancial network from a di¤erent perspective. Links
are now dened as the ratio of bilateral assets to GDP of the source country:
linkijt =
Assetsijt
GDPit
(6)
This network is directed: an arrow pointing from county i to j represents the value of country
is assets in country j, scaled by country is GDP.
The directed network conrms the ndings from the undirected network that there has been
a remarkable increase in interconnectivity over time, as shown by the increase in the size of the
nodes and the size and number of links.
To analyse which countries are the main sources and destinations of international investment, a
number of measures of network centrality are computed for each node. Table 2 reports the ranking
of the ve most central nodes according to each centrality measure.
The key ndings that emerge from the network charts and the centrality measures are as follows:
 The US, the UK and Germany are the main recipients of foreign investment. This can be seen
by the number of arrows pointing to these nodes and by the high value of in-degree centrality,
which measures the number of links that arrive at a node divided by the maximum number
of links.
 Financial centres - Hong Kong, Singapore and the UK - are the main originators of foreign
investment, as can be seen by the number of arrows pointing out and the high value of out-
degree centrality, which measures the number of links that depart from a node divided by the
maximum number of links.
 The countries which are located closer to other nodes in the network are the US, Germany,
Hong Kong, Singapore, and the UK. Closeness is the inverse of the average distance between
countries, where distance is measured by the number of links on the shortest path.
 The US and the UK are the main countries connecting other nodes. This is captured by
betweenness centrality, which measures the frequency with which a country lies on the shortest
path between two other countries, and intermediation, which captures the intensity of links
by incorporating portfolio shares.
 The US and UK also score highest in terms of prestige. Prestige reects the importance
of the counterparties. A country with high prestige is one that is linked to others that have
themselves high prestige. This is computed by assigning to each country the same initial score
and adding a term involving the scores of the creditors, weighted by the portfolio shares. The
prestige scores are simultaneously determined in a system of equations.
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4.3 Comparison with the Trade Network
To compare the nancial network with the trade network, Figure 5 represents the undirected trade
network, where links are given by the sum of exports and imports divided by the sum of the GDP
of the source and host countries:
linkijt =
Exportsijt + Im portsijt
GDPit +GDPjt
(7)
Data on bilateral trade are from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS).
The thickness of the lines is proportional to the size of the links and the size of the nodes
is proportional to the countrys trade openness, measured by the sum of total exports and total
imports divided by GDP. Countries are placed more centrally in the network if they are more
interconnected and pairs of countries with strong links are placed closer to each other.
Table 3 reports measures of skewness, average path length and the clustering coe¢ cient for the
trade network.
A few ndings emerge:
 Just as for the global nancial network, the interconnectivity of the global trade network
increased over the last two decades. This can be seen from the increase in the size and
number of links. However, the size of the nodes does not change much over time. This
suggests that trade openness has not increased as much as nancial openness.
 The distribution of trade links also exhibits a long-tail, with a small number of countries
having large links.
 The average path length has decreased and the clustering coe¢ cient has increased over time.
These are symptoms of an increase in interconnectivity,
These properties are similar to the ones found for the global nancial network and suggest that
trade links have also contributed to the increase in interconnectivity between countries.
To distinguish between sources and destinations of international trade, Figure 6 looks at the
directed trade network, where links are given by the ratio of exports to GDP of the source country:
linkijt =
Exportsijt
GDPit
(8)
An arrow pointing from i to j is proportional to the value of country is exports to country j,
divided by the GDP of country i.
Table 4 reports the ranking of the ve most central countries in this network in 2005 according
to di¤erent measures of centrality.
The directed trade network conrms the increased interconnectivity found in the undirected
network. It also highlights some additional facts:
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 In all years, the trade network exhibits strong intra-continental links, with three clusters:
an American cluster (US, Canada and Mexico), an Asian cluster (Singapore, Hong Kong,
China, Korea, and Japan), and a European cluster (UK, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, and
Portugal). This pattern contrasts with the one found for nancial links, where the UK and
the US were clearly at the centre of the network, linking to almost all other nodes.
 Germany, China and France are important trade centres and score highly both as exporters
and as importers. The US is the main importer, but scores low as an exporter. The opposite
is true for Singapore, which is the main exporter, but scores low as an importer.
 Germany appears to be the centre of the European cluster and China appears to be the centre
of the Asian cluster. These countries play an important role connecting other nodes, as can
be seen by their high scores for betweenness and intermediation.
 The UK occupies a much less central position in the trade network than in the nancial
network. While for nance the UK had high scores for all centrality measures this is not the
case for trade.
The network gures represent snapshots of the nance and trade networks at three points in
time: 1985, 1995, and 2005. Another way to look at these networks is to have a dynamic repre-
sentation of how they evolve over the sample period. This can be done using network animations
where time evolves from 1980 to 2005 and each slide represents a year. For the international -
nancial network, links are given by the sum of bilateral assets and liabilities divided by the sum of
the GDPs of the two countries. The thickness of the links is scaled by this measure. The size of
the nodes is scaled by the countrynancial openness, measured as the sum of its total external
assets and liabilities divided by GDP. For the international trade network, links are given by the
sum of bilateral exports and imports divided by the sum of the GDPs of the two countries. The
size of the nodes is proportional to the countrys trade openness, measured by the sum of its total
exports and imports divided by GDP. As for the snapshots, pairs of countries with stronger links
are placed closer to each other in the network.
<Animations 1 and 2 can be found at http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/teach/lipasa/animations.htm>
The animation of the nancial network conrms the increase in interconnectivity suggested by
the snapshots. The size of the links increases over time and countries become more nancially open
over time, as show by the increase in the size of the nodes. The US, the UK and nancial centres
such as Hong Kong and Singapore occupy a central position in the network.
The animation of the trade network also shows evidence of an increase in interconnectivity.
The size of the nodes changes little over time, suggesting that trade openness did not increase as
much as nancial openness during this period. In all years, countries are arranged in three intra-
continental clusters: an American cluster (US, Canada and Mexico), an Asian cluster (Singapore,
Hong Kong, China, Korea, and Japan), and a European cluster (UK, Germany, France, Spain,
Italy, and Portugal). Australia tends to locate near the Asian cluster.
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5 Cross-border nancial links and international transmission of
shocks
What does the conguration of the international nancial network suggest about the stability of
the international nancial system?
Higher interconnectivity carries a fundamental trade-o¤. On the one hand, it enhances risk-
sharing by allowing countries to better diversify idiosyncratic risks. If a country holds assets abroad
and is hit by a country-specic shock, the consequences of the shock are likely to be less severe
because, although the protability of domestic assets is likely to be diminished, the country can
still enjoy high returns on its foreign investment. Openness to international capital ows also has
other benets, such as increased e¢ ciency and overall superior growth opportunities. On the other
hand, higher connectivity increases the risk of contagion. If a shock hits a highly inter-connected
country, its creditors will su¤er losses because the protability of their investment falls and the
country may have to default on its foreign debt. This could generate a cascade of losses through
the system.
The international nancial network is not only highly interconnected but has long-tails, with
some countries having multiple and large links. As a result, the international nancial system
is susceptible to targeted attacks a¤ecting the key nancial hubs (most importantly, the US and
the UK). Disturbances to those hubs would spread rapidly and generate large losses through the
network.
The 2007-2009 nancial crisis can be used to analyse the role of cross-border nancial links
in the international transmission of a US-based shock. There is some evidence that cross-border
nancial links helped spread the crisis to emerging markets and advanced economies. Figure 7
shows that, after a period of strong growth in 2006 and 2007, international bank loans to emerging
and developing countries contracted. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2010) nd that international banks
played an important role in the transmission of the nancial crisis to emerging markets, via three
channels. First, there was a reduction in cross-border lending by foreign-owned banks. Second, for-
eign a¢ liates had to cut local lending because of a reduction in funding by the parent bank. Third,
domestically-owned banks had to cut lending as a result of a reduction in cross-border interbank
lending. On the transmission of the crisis to advanced economies, Imbs (2009) nds an increase
in business cycle synchronization during the crisis, especially between advanced economies. He
shows that the larger synchronization between pairs of countries is associated with larger bilateral
nancial links between them.
6 Conclusions
This article takes stock of the current state of knowledge on the geographic composition of countries
external balance sheets. It reviews the main sources of data on bilateral nancial assets and
liabilities, discusses the use of gravity models to explain the determinants of those bilateral holdings
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and presents some key stylized facts on the international nancial network.
There is still a long way to go to understand the geographic composition of countriesexternal
balance sheets. Increased availability of data on bilateral external positions would help provide
a more complete picture of cross-border nancial linkages, improving our understanding of the
international transmission of shocks. The data gaps are particularly important for emerging markets
and custodial centres. Apart from the need for more comprehensive data on bilateral nancial
holdings, the custodial centre biasneeds to be addressed. Ideally, data based both on the residence
principle and on the country of ultimate ownership should be available. By comparing the two, the
role played by custodial centres in the international nancial system could be properly understood.
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Appendix. Denitions
Average path length
Average of the shortest paths between all pairs of nodes in a network. For example, if node i
is directly linked to node k, the shortest path between the two nodes has length one. If node i is
linked to k via j, the shortest path between i and k has length two. Average path length is the
average of this measure for all pairs of nodes.
Clustering
A measure of the probability that, given that node i is directly linked to nodes j and k, node j
is also directly linked to k. The clustering coe¢ cient is given by
P
i;j 6=i;k 6=j;k 6=iNijNikNjkP
i;j 6=i;k 6=j;k 6=iNijNik
, where Nij
is equal to one if there is a link between nodes i and j and zero otherwise.
Gravity models
Empirical models that explain nancial transactions or holdings between two countries by their
sizes (GDPs) and a variety of variables capturing information asymmetries or familiarity e¤ects
between them. These models have traditionally been used to explain trade ows, but have increas-
ingly been applied to explain nancial transactions or holdings. Their empirical specication for
cross-sectional data takes the form:
ln(Xij) =  
MX
m=1
mZ
m
ij + i + j + "ij
where Xij are nancial assets of country i in country j, Zmij is a set of variables that capture
information asymmetries or familiarity e¤ects (for example, log distance or common language) and
i and j are source and destination country xed e¤ects.
Home bias puzzle
The nding that investors allocate a large proportion of their wealth to domestic assets, in spite
of the potential benets from diversifying into foreign assets.
International nancial network
A representation of the international nancial system where each country is represented by
a node and bilateral nancial holdings or transactions are represented by links between pairs of
countries.
Network centrality
Measures of the importance of di¤erent nodes in a network. Di¤erent denitions exist:
 In-degree is the number of links that point to a node divided by the total possible number
of links.
 Out-degree is the number of links departing from a node divided by the total possible
number of links.
 Closeness is the inverse of the average distance from node i to all other nodes. The denition
of distance relies on path counts. If node i links to k and k links to j, then the path from i to
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j has length two. The distance between i and j, ij , equals the length of the shortest path.
The average distance from i to all other nodes is given by
P
j ij
n 1 . Closeness is the inverse of
this measure.
 Betweenness focuses on the nodes that the shortest path goes through. Let gjk denote the
number of shortest paths between j and k, and gjk(i) denote the number of such paths that
go through node i. The probability that node i is on the shortest path from j to k is given
by gjk(i)gjk . Betweenness of node i is the sum of these probabilities over all nodes excluding i,
divided by the maximum that the sum can attain:
P
j 6=i
P
k 6=i gjk(i)=gjk
(n 1)(n 2) :
 Intermediation extends the betweenness measure taking into account the value of the links.
The probability that a dollar sent by i reaches j in two steps is given by
P
k PikPkj , where Pik
is the share of country is total external assets that are invested in country k. The probability
that a dollar sent by i reaches j through k is given by PikPkjP
k PikPkj
. The intermediation measure
for node k is obtained by summing these probabilities for all pairs (i; j), divided by the total
number of pairs n(n  1).
 Prestige considers the identity of the counterparties. The prestige of country i (i) is obtained
by taking the prestige of its creditors, weighted by their portfolio shares with i, i.e., i =P
j Pjij . This denes a linear system  = P
0, where P is the matrix of portfolio shares.
The solution to this system is the eigenvector associated with the unit eigenvalue.
Skewness
A measure of the asymmetry of a distribution. It is dened as E(X )
3
(E(X )2)3=2 , where X is a
random variable and  is its mean. A normal distribution is symmetric and has a skewness of zero.
A positive value for skewness indicates that the distribution has a long-tail on the right, i.e., there
are many observations with small values of and few observations with large values of X.
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Figure 1 International financial integration: 1970-2007 
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NOTE: International financial integration measured as the ratio of the sum of foreign assets and liabilities to GDP (in percentage). 
Luxembourg is excluded from the group of industrial countries (data for this country only start in 1990). 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti ‘External Wealth of Nations’ dataset.  
 
Figure 2 Foreign exchange reserves of developing and emerging economies: 1995-2009 
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SOURCE: IMF COFER dataset. 
 
 
Figure 3 International financial network – undirected 
1985 
 
1995 
 
2005 
 
NOTE: Links are given by the sum of bilateral assets and liabilities divided by the sum of the GDPs of the source and host 
countries. The size of the nodes is proportional to the country’s financial openness, measured by the sum of its total external 
assets and liabilities divided by GDP. More interconnected countries are placed more centrally in the network and pairs of 
countries with stronger links are placed closer to each other. Figures are drawn in Pajek (Program for Analysis and 
Visualization of Large Networks). 
SOURCE: Adapted with permission from Kubelec, C. and Sá, F. (2010). The geographical composition of national external 
balance sheets: 1980-2005. Bank of England Working Paper 384. 
Figure 4 International financial network – directed 
1985 
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2005 
 
NOTE: Links are given by the ratio of bilateral assets to GDP of the source country. The size of the nodes is proportional 
to the country’s financial openness, measured by the sum of its total external assets and liabilities divided by GDP.  
SOURCE: Adapted with permission from Kubelec, C. and Sá, F. (2010). The geographical composition of national external 
balance sheets: 1980-2005. Bank of England Working Paper 384. 
Figure 5 International trade network – undirected 
1985 
 
1995 
 
2005 
 
NOTE: Links are given by the sum of bilateral exports and imports divided by the sum of the GDPs of the source and host 
countries. The size of the nodes is proportional to the country’s trade openness, measured by the sum of its total exports 
and imports divided by GDP. 
SOURCE: Adapted with permission from Kubelec, C. and Sá, F. (2010). The geographical composition of national external 
balance sheets: 1980-2005. Bank of England Working Paper 384. 
Figure 6 International trade network – directed 
1985 
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2005 
 
NOTE: Links are given by the ratio of bilateral exports to GDP of the source country. The size of the nodes is proportional 
to the country’s trade openness, measured by the sum of its total exports and imports divided by GDP. 
SOURCE: Adapted with permission from Kubelec, C. and Sá, F. (2010). The geographical composition of national external 
balance sheets: 1980-2005. Bank of England Working Paper 384. 
Figure 7 External loans to developing and emerging countries 
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SOURCE: BIS Locational Banking Statistics, external loans of reporting banks vis-à-vis individual countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics for the international financial network 
 
 1985 1995 2005 
Skewness 7.62 7.96 3.25 
Average path length 1.55 1.44 1.37 
Clustering coefficient 0.71 0.83 0.84 
SOURCE: Adapted with permission from Kubelec, C. and Sá, F. (2010). The geographical composition of national 
external balance sheets: 1980-2005. Bank of England Working Paper 384. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Ranking of five most central countries in the international financial network in 2005 
 
SOURCE: Adapted with permission from Kubelec, C. and Sá, F. (2010). The geographical composition of national external 
balance sheets: 1980-2005. Bank of England Working Paper 384. 
 
 
 
 
 
In-degree Out-degree Closeness Betweenness Intermediation Prestige 
US Hong Kong  US US US US 
Germany  Singapore  Germany UK UK UK 
UK UK Hong Kong Spain Germany Germany 
France  France  Singapore Germany Spain France 
Japan  Spain  UK France France Japan 
Table 3. Summary statistics for the international trade network 
 
 1985 1995 2005 
Skewness 3.44 5.91 3.78 
Average path length 1.70 1.59 1.44 
Clustering coefficient 0.60 0.76 0.78 
SOURCE: Adapted with permission from Kubelec, C. and Sá, F. (2010). The geographical composition of national external 
balance sheets: 1980-2005. Bank of England Working Paper 384. 
 
 
Table 4. Ranking of five most central countries in the international trade network in 2005 
 
SOURCE: Adapted with permission from Kubelec, C. and Sá, F. (2010). The geographical composition of national external 
balance sheets: 1980-2005. Bank of England Working Paper 384. 
 
 
 
 
In-degree Out-degree Closeness Betweenness Intermediation Prestige 
US Singapore US China US US 
Germany  Germany Singapore Germany Germany China 
China China Germany  Hong Kong China Germany 
France  France  China Singapore UK UK 
UK Spain  France US France France 
